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Preface and Acknowledgments

Historical inquiry is often predicated on deceptively simple questions,
one of which is “Why did people do that?” Answers are typically formulated around a combination of internal motivations and external
factors: prevailing socioeconomic conditions, calculations of personal
or political advantage, national security requirements, ethnic loyalties,
or other cultural norms. The question of the objective sought becomes
more urgent when the action taken appears, at least to the contemporary observer, hard to justify. Thus we tend to be more engaged by the
actions of history’s wrongdoers than by those of the well intentioned,
who remain, for many, historically dull. Does the work of European colonialists fall into that category of historical wrongdoing? Superﬁcially
at least, the answer must surely be “yes.” Imperial conquest and a colonial domination founded on racial differentiation and exclusion is indefensible on numerous grounds. Yet to scratch the surface of colonial
history is to reveal countless ardent imperialists for whom colonialism
was self-evidently virtuous, morally unimpeachable, even ethically imperative. Thus we return to our opening question: “Why?”
The external factors mentioned above provide answers, but not a
comprehensive explanation of imperialists’ motivations. To reach that,
we need to think about the components of their cultural outlook, the
sources of their attitudes toward such issues as nation, race, ethnicity,
gender, and religion. In short, we have to look deeper into the colonizers’ minds. It is the purpose of this book and its companion volume,
The French Colonial Mind, Volume 2: Violence, Military Encounters,
and Colonialism, to explore these questions.
The two linked volumes of The French Colonial Mind originated in
ix
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Preface and Acknowledgments

a conference held at the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies over a sunny spring weekend in April 2007. Hosted by
the Centre for the Study of War, State, and Society, the conference was
generously supported by the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Exeter’s Department of History. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their support here. The two anonymous readers who each read the manuscripts
for each volume did a wonderful job in pointing us to additional lines of
enquiry. Robert Aldrich helped clarify the conference’s organizing theme,
and his outstanding work over many years was a key inspiration for it.
Ruth Ginio also kindly read my introductions to both volumes and, as
usual, made incisive suggestions about how to improve them. As editor,
I would also like to thank Claire Keyte and Andrew Thorpe at Exeter
and Heather Lundine, Bridget Barry, Joeth Zucco, and Jim Le Sueur at
the University of Nebraska Press for their invaluable help in bringing
the project to fruition. Editing is sometimes regarded as a rather thankless task. That has certainly not been the case for me, for which I thank
all of the contributors to The French Colonial Mind, as well as our outstanding copyeditor, Jane Curran. Producing the volumes has been a
real pleasure and a rich source of insight into the many facets of French
colonialism. I’ve learned a lot and enjoyed myself doing so. I hope that
readers will derive something similar from the chapters that follow.
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Introduction
Mapping the French Colonial Mind
martin thomas

What is the French colonial mind? The proposition that there existed
a collective conscious, or unconscious, thought process — a universal
mind of French colonialism — that inﬂuenced, determined, or otherwise
affected key decisions in the colonial encounter may appear ambitious to
the credulous, ludicrous to the skeptic. There were, of course, countless
supporters of imperialism, thousands of empire administrators, seemingly endless colonial minds. Yet, whether treated in the singular or
the plural, investigating the mind — or minds — of colonialism promises
valuable results. Why?
Historians typically search for links between extraneous factors and
personal motivations in seeking to explain why individuals, groups,
institutions, or governments acted in particular ways. Central to this is
the mental universe — the outlook or worldview — of those involved in
the events or decisions analyzed. The challenge facing scholars of empire
is to study the commonalities among colonial minds while acknowledging the dangers of oversimpliﬁcation. Attitudinal formation and the
derivation of shared ideas are critical, often revealing more subtleties
than stereotypes. As Susan Bayly has argued in relation to Paul Mus,
one of France’s most reﬂective and inﬂuential thinkers on the cultures of
the Indochinese peninsula, careful interrogation of the idea of “colonial
minds” challenges the generic applicability of the stock terminology
familiar to scholars of colonial history, from “civilizing mission” to
xi
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“Orientalism” and notions of the Other.1 Even in the case of the other
turn-of-the-century Francophone empire, King Leopold’s Congo Free
State, the once widely accepted notion that the early paths of Belgian
imperialism were reducible to the beliefs and desires of a single royal
mind has now been exploded. Confronted with diverse peoples and
practices, Belgium’s imperialists, like their French cousins, “had multiple
‘others’ against which to deﬁne [their] identity.”2 Their responses were
as multifaceted as the cultures they encountered. As in the Belgian case,
so in the French, the suggestion that the connections between mental
processes and identity formation could be precisely mapped or, more
ambitious still, reduced to singular generic characteristics, might also
raise scholarly eyebrows. Yet, strip these ideas down to their essentials,
to their individual components, and the colonial mind quickly becomes
an essential and familiar analytical tool. For colonial mind-sets, individual or collective, were products of their cultural environment and their
historical moment. Seen in this light, study of the colonial mind — or
minds — builds on the body of work regarding cultures of empire, which
ranks among the fastest growing and the most dynamic in the ﬁeld of
colonial history.3
It has, for instance, become almost inconceivable that a general history of empire and its rulers could be written without consideration of
social mores and cultural practices, of habit, tradition, and custom, as
well as politics and economics.4 Colonial minds made possible what
Ann Stoler has termed the “imperial formations” on which the legal,
institutional, and cultural bases of colonial discrimination were built.
The legitimization of discrimination and coercive extraction derived
from commonplace ideas among imperialists of the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries who, as Stoler puts it, justiﬁed “imperial guardianship, trusteeships, delayed autonomy, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian works,
violent intervention in the name of human rights, and security measures
in the name of peace.”5 Imperial formations, the product of shared
presumptions and cultural norms, determined the forms of knowledge
production regarding colonial societies within European imperial states.6
As a result these formations provided the building blocks with which to
construct what Roland Barthes termed “the myth of French imperiality.”
xii
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This rhetoric of order from chaos, of cultural elevation within the fabric
of “greater France,” achieved widespread currency among politicians,
intellectuals, and the wider public in twentieth-century France.7 The
underlying anxieties and unspoken fears of colonial ofﬁcials only too
aware of the actual fragility of their colonial presence, were rarely articulated in bureaucratic reports and government correspondence. And
yet, as Stoler has again shown, such insecurity was deeply embedded in
the very processes of reportage, surveillance, and segregation that helped
make colonial rule inherently exclusionary and repressive. Investigating
colonial attitudes helps us decode the bombast so common in ofﬁcial colonial documentation.8 They reveal the gaps between the self-assurance
with which empire was represented as a force for good on paper and
the persistent doubts and fears among ofﬁcials daily confronted with a
majority population unremittingly hostile or, at best, indifferent to their
claims of imperial improvement.
The few individuals, largely at the extreme left of the political spectrum or among the literary and artistic avant-garde, who opposed such
representations of empire resorted to shock tactics in their efforts to
persuade French opinion that colonialism was anything but benevolent.9
Initially, at least, few took notice. Far more inﬂuential were the changing
patterns of academic engagement with empire, which lent intellectual
weight to the belief that France pursued a higher imperial purpose than
mere strategic, economic, or political advantage. The role of such empireoriented disciplines as social anthropology, psychology, and ethnography
is now placed squarely alongside the perhaps better-known academic
specialties — classical history, geography, and Darwinian biology — as
determinants of European imperialist credos.10 Understandings of the
physical challenges of living and working in arid, tropical, or otherwise
forbidding colonial climates were shaped by the belief, increasingly prevalent in France and Britain from the mid-nineteenth century, that successful colonization demanded mastery of the science of acclimatization.
Focused primarily on the exploitation of unfamiliar ﬂora and fauna and
on conquering the physiological problems, diseases, and other maladies
encountered by Europeans in the colonial world, an underlying assumption behind acclimatization’s scientiﬁc precepts was that Western science
could tame the colonial environment, harnessing it to European ends.11
xiii
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Yet, while such scientiﬁc colonialism emboldened French colonizers to
persist in the face of physical adversity, it was widely accepted that the
unfamiliarity and daily hardships of life in the colonies could destabilize
the European mind. Empire was dangerous, not just physically but also
psychologically. Fears were stoked in the realms of the imagination,
fueled by both penny-press scaremongering and academic treatises produced on both sides of the English Channel in which a strong tendency
developed, particularly evident in the medical context, to “sensationalize” the pathological threats inherent to Africa especially. Prolonged
exposure to life in the colonies could wreck the mind as much as the
body, producing that quintessentially colonial malady, “tropical neurasthenia.”12 Aside from the menace of disease and mental breakdown,
as one of our contributors, Emmanuelle Sibeud, has argued elsewhere,
the social dangers that colonies and empire service presented were very
much constructed by the colonizers. The colonial ofﬁcials, doctors,
missionaries, and other quasi-professional ethnographers who tried to
codify the cultures with which they came into contact are now rightly
seen not merely as the observers of colonial society but also as its creators.13 Yet colonialism was a complex process, often dependent as much
on collaboration as on conquest. The legal codes, customary practices,
and economic transactions it generated rested on cultural borrowing.
Only through the co-option of traditional elites and the compliance of
thousands of local clerks, translators, and other adjuncts did colonial
“administration” become possible at all.14 A sustained colonial presence
rested more on hybridity — cultural and administrative — than ruling ofﬁcials cared to admit. Little wonder then that nineteenth-century racial
theorists, Gustave Le Bon and Arthur Gobineau prominent among them,
depicted colonial expansion and the resultant intercultural contacts not
just as transformative but also as corruptive of the innate superiority
of the French.15
If Le Bon and Gobineau represented one, particularly ugly, extreme
of French reﬂections on colonialism, the administrators, soldiers, artists, and academics who viewed empire in more positive terms were
no less prone to misconception. Whether anthropological, sociological,
or ethnographic, their observations were necessarily artiﬁcial.16 Their
attempts to make sense of the unfamiliar drew on preexisting ideas,
xiv
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often on comparisons with other, foreign examples of phenomena that
appeared in some way similar to what now confronted them. All were
exterior points of reference, a reminder that colonial minds, like any
others, came laden with presumptions. Moreover, those being observed
were not just abstract “subjects” of enquiry but living subjects of colonial rule.17 How, then, could they be considered dispassionately on their
own terms? All this is to suggest that concepts of modernity and cultural
authenticity, of state formation and capitalist economic organization in
dependent territories, each of them central to our understanding of what
colonialism involved, require prior consideration of the intellectual and
attitudinal basis of European imperialism. As historian Frederick Cooper has recently observed in the context of French imperialist opinion
after World War II, to comprehend colonialism, one must address how
European imperial nations began “thinking like an empire.”18 Colonial
minds, French or otherwise, are now integral to the study of empires,
nations, and “natives.”19
Identiﬁable commonalities of outlook — the product of education,
career background, or lived experience — help us to grasp why those in
positions of colonial power acted as they did, whether as governors, as
economic overseers, as missionaries, or, conversely, as critics of empire.
Certain aspects of imperialist thinking will always be integral to such
analysis. Examples include attitudes toward an imperial “mission civilisatrice” or a “white man’s burden,” the changing philosophical and
ideological justiﬁcations advanced for colonial rule, the borrowing of
administrative practice and juridical form from other colonial environs
or from other imperial rivals, and the intellectualization of race theory.20
As Robert Nye has pointed out, racist ideas, anxiety about ethnic mixing, and dire eugenicist predictions of societal degeneration were not
conﬁned to the extremist margins of European intellectual thought in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Quite the reverse: such
ideas featured in a whole raft of scientiﬁc, medical, and political writing,
gradually transferring into the mainstream current of ideas in France
and elsewhere.21
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the minutiae of colonial
codes of practice, whether administrative or commercial, military or legal. As Emmanuelle Saada has argued, just as colonial law made French
xv

Buy the Book

Introduction

prestige an inviolable concept, so it provided new legal frameworks
to help police racial boundaries. Such restrictions cut both ways: on
the one hand, sleights on the honor of colonial ofﬁcials were a serious
criminal offense; on the other, French ofﬁcials were increasingly expected
to exercise sexual self-restraint to conserve their “dignity” as members
of the ruling elite.22 Parallels might be drawn here with their brethren
in the business community, although European traders and managers
rarely faced the same level of sanction for “misconduct” toward their
contacts and employees.23 If the sexual preoccupations of certain fonctionnaires are now well known, other recesses of the colonial mind remain less explored. Beneath the horizon of landmark decisions of policy
and principle the professional, social, and familial milieus inhabited by
colonial ofﬁcials, soldiers, educators, religious orders, or settlers also
molded responses to the workaday challenges of colonial life, whether
at the level of high policy or at that of personal interaction with indigenous peoples.24 Understood as the study of attitudes, presumptions, and
expectations, investigating the colonial mind thus becomes something
achievable and useful: an attempt to unpick the constituent parts of
imperialist (and to a degree anti-imperialist) thought and daily practice.
So is this really a collection of essays about colonial mentalities?
Building on the Annales School’s approach to histories of the everyday,
historians of mentalities have tried to codify the formative inﬂuences of
social customs, religious observance, education, the use of language, and
other behavioral norms in conﬁguring habits of mind. Theirs is a view
of history that considers cultural practice one of the key determinants of
social action. What people do reﬂects how they have been conditioned
to think, whether at an intellectual or an emotive level, and this process is in turn driven by identiﬁable inﬂuences such as those referred to
above. Cultural outlooks, or mentalities, imperceptibly formed over the
long term, are thus judged to have a greater bearing on human action
than the more episodic and transient political events that have typically
predominated in historical enquiry.25
Does it follow that a study of colonial minds must take mentalities
and the antipolitical history leanings of the Annales as its starting point?
Not necessarily. Several of the chapters in both this volume and its
partner, Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism, combine apxvi
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preciation for socioeconomic change and formative cultural inﬂuences
with abiding concern for the political “event history” disparaged by the
Annales School. If anything, the essays in both volumes demonstrate the
interactions between the two, between patterns of behavior and individual agency within the events described.26 Taking a cue from international history’s obsession with the mutually reinforcing presumptions of
bureaucratic elites, several contributors here look beyond the politicians
and colonial governors supposedly at the apex of French imperial rule to
consider the derivation of their ideas and policy choices. The “unspoken
assumptions” of colonial actors are every bit as important as those of
the high political actors that James Joll examined so carefully in tracing
the attitudes of mind — the “worldview” — that drove them into taking
fateful decisions for war in 1914.27
Mary Lewis called recently for historians of empire to look beyond
the binary oppositions of metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized,
to recognize the connections between internal societal dynamics and
wider international rivalries. It is a welcome rallying cry that several
of the chapters in this and its partner volume take up, acknowledging
that French colonial attitudes and practices were neither entirely forged
in French-ruled territory nor solely with French geopolitical interests
in mind.28 Put differently, as Lewis herself has demonstrated, the local
and the international were always linked. French colonial bureaucrats,
wherever they were posted, usually acted in ways that were recognizably
French, but that often displayed other inﬂections — perhaps born of their
earlier career paths in different countries, perhaps derived from rulings,
treaties, or other limitations imposed by international organizations such
as the League of Nations. Equally, colonial subjects were just as likely
to respond to the colonial presence in ways that mirrored their own
experiences of the foreign. These experiences were as many as they were
varied but include such dislocating factors as intermarriage, slaving, itinerant trading, seasonal movements to different pasturage, and economic
migration. The colonial world, in other words, was in some ways more
cosmopolitan than some depictions of predominantly sedentary peasant
societies allow. Rulers and ruled were, moreover, aware of the disruptive potential of rival imperial powers, whose presence across a nearby
frontier or, closer to home, within the consulates, missions, and comxvii
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mercial premises of the colony posed discrete challenges to untrammeled
French domination.29 Whether at the international level of competition
between states or at the transnational level of economic, cultural, and
political ties between communities across imperial boundaries, colonial
rule could never shut out extraneous inﬂuences. Indeed, as Frederick
Cooper and Jane Burbank have convincingly demonstrated, one of the
things that made empires such durable political units was their capacity
to accommodate diverse peoples, traditions, and practices.30 Foreign
experiences, foreign presences: both affected colonial minds.
If not uniquely French in its derivation, colonialist thinking was, ﬁrst
and foremost, elitist in its most fundamental presumption that hierarchy
and the uneven distribution of power were both politically essential
and ethically defensible. While French colonial minds provide our focus
here, the contributors accept that these elite ﬁgures and the decisions
they reached were subject to multiple inﬂuences, domestic, colonial, and
foreign. The goal then is to connect cultural assumptions with political
outcomes, the origins of prevalent colonialist ideas with the practical
consequences of such thinking.
Another consideration comes into play here. Perhaps, as with international systems, so with colonial empires; political actors, whether
backroom ofﬁcials or leading politicians, do not begin from the proposition that they can bend the system/empire to their will but start from
a recognition that the system/empire sets narrow limits to what could
realistically be achieved.31 And constraints on action could be ﬁnancial,
economic, or technological rather than narrowly political or military. As
this implies, ruling empire was not simply a matter of bilateral relations
between metropolitan center and colonial periphery. Several contributors in both of the Colonial Mind volumes have more to say about the
transnational, about substate interactions across political (or colonial)
frontiers than the high politics of French colonial policy. Theirs is a view
of empire in which rigid divides between mother country and colony,
between individual colonies, or between governors and governed cannot
be sustained. The model of a honeycomb recently proposed by Patricia
Clavin to help deﬁne transnational relationships is useful here. Bounded
and interlinked, but with discrete spaces in which particular activities
were performed, the honeycomb view of transnational imperial relations
xviii
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has much to commend it.32 Yet at the risk of stretching a point, just as in
a beehive, so within an empire, the colony is ultimately bound together
by service to a single authority. As other contributors in this volume
make plain, studying the queen bees can be rewarding. High-policy
initiatives sometimes provided the clearest — and most signiﬁcant — evidence of the material impact of attitudes and presumptions. Whether
investigating those in high ofﬁce or those working on the peripheries of
empire, colonial minds, it seems, are not easily conﬁned within any of
history’s subdisciplinary boundaries.
Set in the context of the French colonial empire, this analysis of intellectual formation inevitably engages with debates about the nature and
purpose of empire, about the real and the imaginary in French colonialism. Some of these arguments — regarding the relationship between
republicanism and imperialism, about the place of Christian religion in
colonial settings, about the social consequences of economic development — are of long standing. All were central to colonial policies and actions from at least the early nineteenth century onward. Their centrality
to the study of colonial history, rightly, persists.33 Other debates — about
the social construction of ethnic difference, about the exploitative aspects of colonial gender relations, about the forms of violence (physical,
psychological, cultural) inherent to colonial domination, about memories of empire and the commemoration or memorialization of decisive
colonial events — are more contemporary, demarcating and sometimes
dividing scholars of the “new imperial history.”34
To be sure, thinking about what put the “colonial” into French minds
cannot alone provide a comprehensive understanding of empire. The very
term “colonial minds” suggests an analytical preoccupation with the derivations of attitude and the connections between underlying assumptions
and colonial actions among the insiders within various imperial projects,
whether ofﬁcial, military, corporate, or cultural. Such a precise focus has
potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most obvious is, almost by deﬁnition, less
engagement with the minds of colonial subjects than with the rulers of
empire. But maybe such rigid distinctions are misleading anyway. Consider, for a moment, an example from another empire — the British. In
1960, three years before Uganda’s independence from Britain, Murray
Carlin, an instructor at Makerere College, wrote the following:
xix
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What we are practising at Makerere, day in and day out, . . . is the
subversion . . . of the African mind; the breaking down of mental
tissues; their reconstruction in the Western mode; the reordering
of thoughts, feelings, habits, responses, of every aspect of the mind
and personality. This is what we are doing, and cannot avoid doing — that is the core of our activity.35
At the time, Makerere College was the sole establishment of higher education in British-ruled East Africa. The implication in Carlin’s words that
the capacity of Makerere staff to reorder African minds was a one-way
process was hardly remarkable. Yet here as elsewhere, it was not just
the colonized whose outlook was transformed by colonial encounters.
Those theoretically charged with molding or monitoring African opinion
were profoundly inﬂuenced by the subjects of their gaze.36
As in the British Empire, so in the French, colonizers’ ways of thinking were ﬂuid, subject to change in response to colonial experience.
But what of those with little direct exposure to life in the colonies?
Numerous French ministers, senior ofﬁcials, inﬂuential business ﬁgures,
soldiers, or intellectuals had important things to say about empire even
if their personal encounters with it were limited. Theirs could still be
“colonial minds,” colonialist in outlook because of the apparent ease
with which they dismissed the opinions of dependent peoples. Except for
those moments of crisis when insurrection threatened the colonial state,
there was, for example, little appreciation among leading metropolitan
policymakers of the “everyday forms of resistance” — the go-slows, noncompliance, verbal opposition, and tax avoidance, among numerous
other things — by which peasant agriculturalists or industrial workers
registered their hostility to colonial rule in a middle ground between
outright rebellion and functional acquiescence.37
Awareness that numerous colonial minds condemned the overwhelming majority of unrepresented Africans, Asians, and others to silence, to
bear mute witness as mere pawns in a grand imperial design, is therefore
critical to any reading of colonialist attitudes, presumptions, or prejudice. And as Greg Mann has warned us, to forget this one-sidedness
is to risk reproducing the very colonialist presumptions about African
practices that the analysis of colonial minds should expose.38 Another
xx
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potential limitation of any work centered on the study of individuals
and the roots of their ideas is that the impersonal, the structural forces
driving processes of colonial change may also be overlooked. Attaching
greater weight to plans, projects, and the origins of imperialist thinking
risks leaving in the shadows long-term social change, economic transformation, international pressures, and other “macro” factors that perhaps
played as great a role in making empire what it was. Perhaps — but
as many of the essays collected here indicate, it need not be this way.
Studying the ideas of French imperialists does not suggest that cultural
diffusion — the spread of ideas and normative standards — was purely
a one-way process. Looking at the French side of the colonial equation
and taking individual agency seriously in doing so does not imply disregard for dependent peoples. Nor does it indicate a rejection of structural
approaches to social change, political economy, or the impact of the
prevailing international system of the day. To take but one example, it
is surely impossible to understand French concerns about the productivity, the cost, and the insurrectionary potential of workers on the rubber
plantations of southern Vietnam without appreciating the underlying
economic processes that led to their proletarianization.39 In this case,
the cultural meets the political at a fundamental level.
Investigations of the cultures that produced colonial minds may
complement structural approaches, not supplant them. Moreover, as
Joachim Görlich has noted in the context of recent ethnographic analyses of colonial Oceania:
These studies concentrate mainly on the cultural practices of colonized groups. The colonial authorities are frequently represented as
undifferentiated, as a homogeneous, hegemonic power block, and
characterized only as instigators of transformations. However, this
perception is too one-sided and does not do justice to the complexity and dynamism of the colonial encounter.40
Görlich is surely right. Just as the colonized defy simple categorization, so colonial minds were never entirely monolithic, nor did they
come to colonial situations or economic relationships with ideas fully
formed. To borrow Andrew Zimmerman’s telling Bourdieu-like phrase
xxi
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in relation to colonial anthropologists, “the ﬁeld constructs the anthropologist” as much as the anthropologist constructs his or her ﬁeld.41 Put
differently, ethnographic knowledge, much like other forms of knowledge about colonial societies, combined presumption and experience,
subjective expectations and real encounters.42 Broadly speaking, such
is the ﬁnding of George Trumball, whose incisive analysis of French
ethnographers at work in Algeria after 1871 pinpoints the limitations
of such encounters:
Deﬁned through relations of participant-observation enmeshed in
unequal power relations, colonial ethnographies trace the histories,
above all, of interactions. The behaviors and beliefs of many Algerians remained occluded, outside of the purview of ethnographers.
Hence, colonial ethnographies, like all administrative archives, perhaps overemphasize zones of contact and interaction.43
Nor were such interactions conﬁned to academic ﬁeldworkers observing colonial societies. Ofﬁcials and settlers were also marked by their
colonial surroundings, by the political situations they confronted. They
were subject to conﬂicting ideas and emotions about what they saw or
what they did.
Moreover, imperial decision makers, like any other individuals, were
also affected by social relations within the particular professional milieus in which they operated. Elites have their own internal hierarchies,
whether within government, within the armed forces, or within religious
orders and educational organizations. Pause for a moment to think
about the apex of French colonial hierarchy: the Ministry of Colonies.
How did the permanent staff of that ministry relate to other, more senior
departments of government with far larger budgets and more inﬂuential
personnel, and how did this change over time? Without a formal ranking
of ministries or a binding system of British-style “collective responsibility” by which it was expected that all ministers should support government decisions, how was consensus reached — and by whom — about the
direction of colonial policy? If there was no common agreement at all,
then which individuals or groups became the ﬁnal arbiters of state — and
colonial-state decision making? Sometimes these decisions did not stem
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from elected representatives, but from within state bureaucracy or from
elite lobby groups collectively described as the “Parti Colonial.” Sometimes colonial governments habitually deﬁed central authority in Paris.
What clearer evidence of dissentient colonial minds could there be than
the notorious, disastrous insubordination of the so-called Saigon clique
of senior ofﬁcials and military ofﬁcers grouped around High Commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu that sped headlong into war with
the Vietminh in 1946 in open deﬁance of their nominal political masters
in Paris.44
Another question we have to ask is thus how politicians related to
permanent ofﬁcials whose specialist expertise could be both intimidating
and excluding? And beyond the walls of government, how did business elites interact with bankers and major overseas investors? How
signiﬁcant was the common ground between these commercial ﬁgures
in shaping ideas about empire, particularly within the highly sectarian
and yet oddly cohesive interest groups of the Parti Colonial?45 Finally,
beyond the boundaries of elite interest, was there room for the general
public either in France or in the colonies to make their collective presence felt in the mental worlds of the powerful? If so, are we talking,
at least before 1945, about the mobilization of predominantly male,
predominantly bourgeois opinion, or about something more intangible:
French society and what it would, or would not, tolerate being done
overseas in its name, but without its express consent?
Most colonial encounters between Europeans and local populations
were, of course, ostensibly remote from state action. These, too, could
reverberate beyond those immediately involved, inﬂuencing wider attitudes to empire and the purposes it served. For increasing numbers
of well-to-do French families of the early twentieth century, the empire
was not only a source of national pride but also an exotic tourist playground, a tapestry of colorful places to visit and different cultures to
“sample.” For the less afﬂuent, the heroic, the exotic, and the titillating were recurrent features of the empire-themed ﬁlms that pervaded
French cinema from the early 1920s to the last days of decolonization.
In these recreational realms, too, colonial minds were at work. To take
one telling example, the colonial authorities employed leading illusionist Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin in the 1850s to tour Algeria. Beguiling
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local notables with mesmerizing tricks, Robert-Houdin was also employed to demonstrate the chicanery of suﬁ marabouts whose claims to
mystical powers were thrown into question by the magician’s sleight of
hand. Here were colonial minds at work. The presumption that Algerians were peculiarly susceptible to supposedly supernatural, miraculous
sights meshed with the ofﬁcial determination to prove the superiority of
French rationality and the hollowness of Muslim alternatives by playing
with the magician’s art.46 Deeply rooted — and deeply ﬂawed — cultural
presumptions rendered such bizarre methods normal. The use of RobertHoudin pointed to what would become a common pattern. Whether in
the production of ofﬁcial guidebooks that depicted colonial subjects and
imperialist achievements in particular ways, in the exploitation of commercial opportunities to generate new sources of revenue from tourist
encounters between French visitors and colonial populations, or in the
distinct racial and economic taxonomies that differentiated the French
from their ﬁctionalized colonial subjects on the cinema screen, colonial
subjects were rendered explicable to imperialist minds through twodimensional stereotypes.47 And these stereotypes were crudest of all in
the sphere of popular leisure. These changing forms of recreation and
popular “consumption” of imperialist ideas also inﬂuenced — and were
inﬂuenced by — the promotion of empire in mainland France, something
that required the engagement of French metropolitan minds with the
colonial project.48
A ﬁnal element to consider here is the national aspect of colonial
minds. That changing forms of popular imperialism were connected
with the development of imperialist attitudes may seem self-evident,
but were the forms or the processes involved uniquely French? As Matthew Stanard has recently observed, such were the commonalities in
attitude toward colonial peoples, dreams of colonial riches, and imperial obligation to “civilize” colonized groups across nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century Europe that it is perhaps impossible to discern
uniquely national imperialisms. These were viral ideas, fast spreading
and seemingly irresistible; their original source was difﬁcult to trace.
In this sense the French colonial minds studied in this volume may offer scholars some means to hold a mirror to their equivalents in other
European imperial states.49
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These multifarious and unquantiﬁable composite elements of attitude formation make our task complicated enough, but there is another level of analysis entirely. Perhaps the minds of political leaders
were largely made up before they faced the countervailing pressures of
ministerial responsibility, party interest, ﬁnancial market pressure, or
voter verdicts. Should we see the agglomeration of competing external
demands on decision makers as secondary to the preexistent attitudes
of mind with which they approached colonial issues? A lofty politician
or colonial governor, even a lowly police ofﬁcer or missionary educator,
might be subject to local political pressure to act in certain ways, but
more inﬂuential still might be their underlying outlook in regard to the
actions they were expected to take. To use the most obvious example,
few questioned the notion that in colonial societies white Europeans
and nonwhite indigenous populations would — and should — be treated
differently. Such attitudes were often the product of ingrained prejudices
and racial assumptions that owed more to family background, cultural
milieus, educational experience, religious dogma, contemporary writings, and — conversely — to ignorance of any alternative way of thinking,
than to speciﬁc instructions from higher authorities that could be located
in time and place. Long years of reinforcement of such assumptions
through social, familial, and professional contact with like-minded individuals carried greater weight than the more sporadic, unorthodox suggestions of a minority that such attitudes might, perhaps, be misguided.
Thus we return to the importance of studying colonial minds to help us
unravel the ways in which material alternatives were understood and
approached. Actions, choices, and decisions rooted in culturally derived
attitudes and practices had lasting political consequences.
These consequences, moreover, lasted beyond the formal end of colonial rule and in some ways endure still. Consider for a moment the
recent struggles between politicians, media commentators, and academics over the ways in which the French colonial past should or should
not be represented in French schools.50 Or witness the contretemps
between former French president Jacques Chirac and his Senegalese
counterpart Abdoulaye Wade over the past contributions and presentday pension rights of West African former servicemen of the French
colonial army.51 Or simply look no further than the paternalist language
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still commonplace in French ofﬁcial pronouncements about former
dependencies, of which French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s otherwise
conciliatory speech to Senegalese students at the University of Dakar
on 27 July 2007 was but one among many.52 All of these examples
remind us that studying colonial minds is not just history, but a matter
of current affairs.
This collection of essays and its partner volume on colonial violence take
as their starting point the proposition that thought precedes action, its
multiple forms notwithstanding. In certain circumstances — for instance,
prior to the launch of a crucial policy initiative or the establishment of a
trading company, a mission school, or a hospital — this reﬂective process
could run to months and years, its twists and turns traceable in the archival record. In other cases — from decisions about where to settle, with
whom to socialize, and how to behave in the company of different ethnic groups or in different communal settings — the “thought” involved
requires more delicate unpicking. These were decisions more likely to
be recorded in personal correspondence, in diaries, or in intimate conversation; often they were not recorded at all. Yet the importance of
such decision making is hard to dispute. Collectively, these patterns of
social behavior among the French communities of empire — the settlers,
ofﬁcials, and others who asserted their pride of place within colonial
society — molded the ways in which empire developed politically, economically, and culturally.
Aside from this concern with the connections between thoughts and
patterns of behavior, the chapters that follow suggest that thought is, to
varying degrees, conditioned by habits of mind. Such habits were — and
are — strongly affected by familial upbringing, educational background,
or the social or professional networks in the context of which the actions
discussed took place. What unites them is their concentration on what
lay behind the decisions or the actions investigated, what made them
possible, indeed probable, and, in some cases, even inevitable. Some
of the events discussed are well known, others far less so. But in their
focus on the derivation of ideas and the often unspoken assumptions of
colonial elites, the essays cast new light on themes familiar to scholars
of colonialism in general, and French colonialism in particular.
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Chapter Content: Volume 1
In the opening chapter of volume 1 Patricia Lorcin reﬂects on the interpretive slants that might be applied to the term “colonial mind” or
its collective equivalent, “colonial minds.” She reviews the themes that
emerge strongly across the two volumes, picking out points of convergence and divergence, as well as other aspects of imperialist attitude
formation that might be further explored. Her chapter is also the prelude
to the four essays in the ﬁrst section of volume 1, all of which examine
various facets of “Colonial Encounters and Imaginings of Empire.”
Picking up from Patricia Lorcin, in her contribution Emmanuelle
Sibeud revisits the issue central to the entire volume: was there ever a
deﬁnitive French colonial mind? Her questioning goes further. If, indeed,
there was an identiﬁable, collective “colonial mind,” how far were intellectuals a part of it? How far, indeed, did they shape it? She answers
these questions by focusing on an individual career, that of Félicien Challaye. Born in 1875, Challaye came to public attention after returning
from Savorgnan de Brazza’s mission to the French Congo. His ferocious
criticism of colonial abuses in Central Africa and the sensational impact
of his writings give the lie to a kind of “absent-minded” imperialism in
the early Third Republic, suggesting that there was no lack of enthusiasm for empire, no lack of contested debate over its human costs, among
the country’s political and intellectual elite. Challaye was certainly no
thoughtless imperialist inured to the cruelties of colonial rule. Yet he accepted the principle, even the inevitability, of colonial expansion, seeing
it as a process that could not be resisted, only controlled. His attitude to
empire was conditioned by the need, as he saw it, to regulate relations
between exploiters and exploited. This led him to place empires and
individual colonies in a hierarchy covering the spectrum from good to
bad colonial governance. These ideas would become central to liberal
and eventually Socialist thinking about the possibilities of “humanist”
imperialism, marking him out as an intellectual architect of the French
imperial mind.53
Ruth Ginio explores the imagination of colonial minds run wild in
her examination of French colonial perceptions of African witchcraft.54
She does so by focusing on allegations of ritual murder and consequent
xxvii

Buy the Book

Introduction

criminal trials in French West African criminal courts during the 1920s
and 1930s. As she points out, colonial obsession with African witchcraft
revealed far more about French fears and stereotypes than about the
African societies being observed. Witchcraft, and especially what were
deﬁned as “witchcraft-related crimes,” elicited a stream of inquiries,
some ofﬁcial, others quasi-scholastic, which brought administrators and
academics together as amateur ethnographers.
Ginio’s chapter considers two instances of this process at work. It
focuses ﬁrst on Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1938), a French philosopher
who wrote extensively on what he deﬁned as the “primitive mind,”
and second on Marcel Prouteaux, a future governor whose interwar
career began as a serving commandant de cercle in Côte d’Ivoire. Prouteaux mounted the largest ofﬁcial investigation hitherto attempted of
witches’ secret societies within his territory. It emerges that these two
men thought very differently about African religion, African social organization, and African minds. Examining their writings comparatively,
Ginio reduces their opposing viewpoints to two core differences: the
capacity of Africans to think and act according to French precepts of
logic, and the utility of prosecuting witchcraft cases in enhancing colonial state control. Where Lévy-Bruhl accepted the former and dismissed
the latter, Prouteaux did the reverse. His more apocalyptic vision of West
African witchcraft as a twentieth-century echo of Europe’s premodern
witch crazes proved the more inﬂuential — and damaging — as more alleged cases of ritual murder went through the colonial legal system.55
John Strachan’s essay revisits the place of empire, in this case, Algeria,
in the intellectual formation — the colonial minds — of two of France’s
most preeminent historians of the twentieth century: Fernand Braudel
and Charles-André Julien.56 Braudel spent most of the 1920s and early
1930s in the colony, taking teaching posts at lycées in Algiers and Constantine to help fund the completion of his doctoral research.57 Julien’s
family had moved to Algeria from Caen in 1906, and their liberal, Dreyfusard leanings helped deﬁne his critical outlook toward the iniquities of
colonialism that he saw around him. If Julien was always the academic
heretic, drawing the hostile attention of the security services for his persistent attacks on colonial government, Braudel was slower to appreciate
the social injustices of colonial rule. He did, however, take issue with the
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study of history at the University of Algiers, which during the interwar
years was dominated by an ethnocentric, Latin perspective on the history
of North Africa and the Mediterranean. In his adoption of the longue
durée perspective on the history of Mediterranean cultures, Braudel
marginalized — and thus implicitly criticized — the French colonial presence, which he identiﬁed as but a ﬂeeting moment in historical time.
Focusing on wartime Indochina under Vichy rule, Anne Rafﬁn demonstrates another side to the colonial encounter and its effects on ofﬁcial minds. She discusses the place of administrative inspection visits as
intelligence-gathering exercises in which the potential for a transfer of
knowledge between governors and governed was all too often missed.
The papers of Governor-General Admiral Jean Decoux reveal remarkably little interaction with Vietnamese, whether members of the indigenous elites or not. Indeed, his accounts of inspection tours recount his
impatience with the subtleties of indigenous cultures and traditions.
Rafﬁn takes this as her starting point for a broader consideration of
Vichy’s “ofﬁcial mind” in Indochina. She posits that there was a classic
administrator “type,” an ofﬁcial class prone to misperception about the
peoples of Indochina. The recurrence of stereotype and the enduring
reluctance to accord value to indigenous forms of social organization
suggest that at certain times and in certain locales such “types” often
came to prominence. Rafﬁn proves the point by focusing on the relationship between Governor Decoux and his fellow naval ofﬁcer, Maurice
Ducoroy, appointed head of the Vichy-style youth organization in Indochina. By mobilizing Vietnamese youth into Vichyite organizations and
attempting to foster a new style colonial patriotism through sport and
other “character-building” activities, Ducoroy’s policies rapidly backﬁred.58 Far from providing a safe, apolitical outlet for youthful energies
and so retarding the development of political consciousness among the
young, mobilization sharpened the very sense of national belonging that
the colonial authorities were anxious to prevent.
The second section of Volume 1, “Language, Culture, and Communities of the Colonial Mind,” contains four essays that address the parts
played by education, media of instruction, and bonds of community in
forging colonial minds.59 Kenneth J. Orosz’s assessment of conﬂict and
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competition between state and missionary educators in the Cameroon
mandate exposes the bitter disagreements over suitable educational practice for colonized minds. He begins from the proposition that however
one chooses to deﬁne such a constituency, the language of instruction
was uniquely inﬂuential in transforming those to be educated. He proves
the point by focusing on the Mandate’s early years, during which an
intense, sectarian war was fought over language policy between the
dominant missionary groups in the territory: the Catholic Spiritains and
their Protestant missionary group rivals. Many of the latter established
their schools during the preceding German colonial era, although they
were largely staffed by British and Americans.
The central argument that divided these groups concerned the medium of instruction in primary school teaching. Determined to recast the
minds of young Camerounais in a French Catholic image, the Spiritains’
espousal of French instruction clashed with Protestant mission groups,
which insisted that progress could be achieved only by teaching in the
African vernacular languages of Cameroon. In spite of French state
backing for French language instruction, the Spiritains underwent a fundamental change of mind in the mid-1920s, accepting that their spiritual
and political message was more effectively delivered in vernacular form.
As Orosz shows, these language wars and their effects, both on missionary minds and on those of the children to pass through mission schools,
compel us to think about the very basis of colonial implantation, speciﬁcally about how colonial ideas were composed and transmitted.
María del Mar Logroño Narbona’s contribution analyzes neglected,
but substantial, communities of colonial minds: the thousands of Syrians
and Lebanese settlers, mainly commercial traders, living across Latin
America in the interwar years. French acquisition of the Syria and Lebanon Mandates in 1920 engaged these communities directly. Furthermore,
the fact that some 20 percent of all Syrians and Lebanese lived outside
the Levant aroused deep concern in the French security services, stirring
fears that these emigrants would become focal points for anticolonial
sedition, nationalist ideas, and hostile propaganda.60 Concentrating on
Latin America, Logroño charts the efforts of French diplomatic and
police agencies to monitor these overseas Levantine communities and
their links with families and acquaintances “back home.” The French
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thereby sought to control the movement of knowledge between the
mandates and their emigrant communities as well as the movement of
people, money, and goods between the two. Logroño’s examination
of this French preoccupation with emigrant opinion suggests that we
should conceptualize the Levant mandates in demographic terms — as
peoples — rather than in merely geographical terms as distinct territorial
locations.
The Levant mandates are also the focal point for Jennifer Dueck’s
chapter, which highlights differential state treatment of confessional
groups in Lebanon, something that helped determine patterns of social
and political change in the mandate. She analyzes the connections, professional and personal, between leading French and Lebanese educators
and political actors, the cumulative result of which was to reinforce the
power of the Maronite Patriarchy. Importantly, however, Dueck points
to growing friction between Jesuit, Catholic, and Maronite religious and
educational institutions as their minds became ﬁxated on the prospect
of Lebanese independence in the years immediately preceding World
War II. Catholic, especially Jesuit, institutions were, above all, anxious
to conserve the status and privileges of their religious and educational
institutions whereas the Maronite Patriarchy was more broadly animated by the consolidation of Maronite dominance within the political elite of an independent Lebanese nation state. In her discussion of
these mounting rivalries and differing political and cultural priorities,
Dueck argues that French efforts to build consensus — a shared colonial
mind — between Lebanon’s French Catholic and Maronite hierarchies
was doomed to failure.61
Algeria is the site for the last essay in this second section. James D.
Le Sueur echoes the preceding essays in arguing that issues of language
and identity were both inseparable and paramount in Algeria’s colonial
and postcolonial politics. Propagating the use of French, imposing strict
language requirements, and denigrating local languages as inferior or obsolete were all weapons used by ofﬁcials in the centralization of colonial
power and the marginalization of precolonial cultures. Favoring certain
languages over others was also integral to the practices of divide and
rule, not least between Berber and Arabic-speaking populations in North
Africa.62 Conversely, as Le Sueur points out, for nationalists in numerxxxi

Buy the Book

Introduction

ous colonial and postcolonial locations an urgent political priority was
to supplant the inauthentic language of the colonizer — English, French,
Portuguese, Afrikaans — with the authentic, local indigenous languages
that had for years been marginalized, even prohibited. Algeria’s Front de
Libération Nationale considered this task pivotal to the rediscovery of
the country’s Arabic and Arabo-Islamic civilization. Arabization began
under Ahmed Ben Bella in 1964 but was pursued with greater intensity
under Houari Boumediene when a process of what Le Sueur dubs “defrenchiﬁcation” gathered pace.
Matters did not run smoothly. Le Sueur detects a disjuncture between
the Arabophones who had been trained and educated according to the
tenets of the Arabization program, but who nonetheless could not secure
the same level of administrative posts or other employments next to
those who were ﬂuent French speakers. Le Sueur then turns his attention
to the colonial authorities in the last days of French Algeria. Ironically,
they too turned to Arabization from 1959 onward, hoping that by doing
so they might reconcile Algerians to a continuing French presence. It
was also hoped that widespread adoption of a distinct Maghreb Arabic,
as opposed to standard Arabic, would render Algerians immune to the
attractions of pan-Arabism and Egyptian-style radicalism. These goals
proved unrealistic. Thwarted by the practical obstacles and political
barriers to such a program, French-controlled Arabization did not get
far. It nonetheless tells us much about colonial minds in the ﬁnal years
of French Algeria as the pursuit of linguistic and cultural integration
acquired greater urgency in the face of the apparent radicalization of
the Arab world.
The ﬁve essays in the third and ﬁnal section of volume 1 discuss what
might be termed “ofﬁcial minds.”63 Each examines changing forms of
imperialist thinking among French colonial administrators after 1945.
Martin Shipway investigates one of the most inﬂuential actors in the
reconﬁguration of the French Empire as French Union between 1944 and
1947.64 His subject, Henri Laurentie, director of political affairs in the
Ministry for Overseas France, was a key ﬁgure in the postwar reconstruction of empire and the immediate origins of the Franco-Vietnam War.
Yet, as Shipway indicates, while Laurentie was a central actor in these
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events, he remained strangely detached from them. Apparently an administrative insider, Laurentie was more the outsider intellectually — too
liberal, too radical, and, in some ways, not enough of a “colonial” mind
to secure acceptance of his ideas. His position was, in this sense, analogous to that of the minister who would build on many of Laurentie’s
ideas, the veteran Socialist Marius Moutet, who would, in turn, ﬁnd
himself marginalized once the scope for radical reform in the Indochina
Federation diminished as the territory edged closer to war with France in
1946.65 As Shipway makes clear, Laurentie’s brief ascendancy during the
late war years came to an abrupt halt even earlier, in September 1945. It
was then that Laurentie dared to suggest that government reform plans,
such as the March 1945 colonial declaration that he had helped draw
up, were unﬁt for their purpose.
What lay behind this spectacular change of colonial mind? Shipway
demonstrates that the answer lies in Laurentie’s distinctive administrative background. He was neither a career colonial ofﬁcial with years of
ﬁeld service nor a graduate of the administrators’ training college, the
École Coloniale. As a result, Laurentie’s view of empire was always more
cosmopolitan and comparative than specialist and local. Laurentie’s case
was more typical in other ways, however. For one, he exempliﬁed the
dichotomy between administrative insider and political outsider that
so often marked out colonial ofﬁcials. Close to the center — even at the
center — of power in their own locale, the empire’s senior administrators found it harder to inﬂuence elite political opinion in metropolitan
France. Sometimes, as in Indochina, this impelled them to backstairs
intrigue.66 In other instances it left ofﬁcials feeling overlooked and ignored. In this sense, Laurentie offers a model of a certain sort of ofﬁcial:
high-minded and farsighted certainly, but frustrated by the mundane
realities of French coalition politics, inter-agency wrangling, and the
scheming of lesser ofﬁcials in Saigon. His was a frustrated colonial mind,
its insights squandered by the political actors and governing ofﬁcials to
whom Laurentie reported.
Véronique Dimier’s contribution puts a different perspective on the
“ofﬁcial mind” of French imperialism by investigating the part played
by former colonial administrators in the overseas aid agencies of the
European Community.67 She points out that, while such ofﬁcials had
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rarely applied indirect rule in practice while serving in the empire, some
of them eventually did so while administering European Economic Community (eec) development aid. As Louis Sicking, another student of
colonial inﬂuences on the eec, has recently pointed out, “France thus
joined two different communities in 1958: the eec and the Community
with its overseas territories. There was no question of a divorce yet. In
the perception of some, this was more a case of bigamy.”68 That France
was able to sustain this bigamous relationship with the eec and its fast
decolonizing black African territories was largely thanks to the former
colonial ofﬁcials that populated key ofﬁces of the eec. As Dimier makes
plain, it is thus possible to read the work of colonial minds even in the
founding constitutional documents of European integration and European development aid to Africa. Her analysis ranges from the provisions
of the Treaty of Rome to those of the Yaoundé Convention and, later
still, the Lomé Convention of 1975. This date marks the endpoint of
her analysis, as it was at Lomé that British ofﬁcials wrested control of
development aid from their French counterparts.
The picture was much different beforehand, as Dimier demonstrates.
Initial European economic development provisions were entirely modeled on the French postwar colonial development scheme. Hence the
recourse to colonial terminology and associationist precepts, styles, and
practices that continued into the 1960s and even into the 1970s. Aid
policy was therefore couched in a paternalist language of European
support for emergent former dependencies. This was not, of course, a
purely African phenomenon; witness, for example, the continuities in
“developmentalist” thinking across the European colonial territories
of Southeast Asia from the 1920s to the 1960s.69 But it was certainly
in black Africa that the eec presence was strongest. Echoing the work
of Christophe Bonneuil, Dimier illustrates that European aid to several
newly independent African countries repackaged a string of state-driven
development schemes informed by colonial era presumptions about the
supremacy of western scientiﬁc rationalism and the continuing African
requirement for European guidance.70
In another replication of erstwhile colonial practice, development
aid administrators toured former colonial territories in order to cement
relationships with client rulers and politicians. In Dimier’s words, not
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only was the European Community’s early aid policy colonial in origin,
but it also was implemented by “colonial administrators at a distance.”
The result of this domination of administrative ofﬁces by colonial minds
was what Dimier terms a new “sedimentation of empire.”
Where Dimier traces French colonial thinking forward from the immediate postwar period, Tony Chafer’s essay begins by looking backward from the perspective of the early Fourth Republic to colonial
policymaking in Francophone West Africa immediately before World
War II. He notes the extent to which pre-1939 precedents remained
central to the delineation and implementation of post-1945 colonial
reform. That said, the postwar period brought to the fore a host of
factors that reconﬁgured colonial administrative practice. Among the
most important were the new bureaucratic agencies, both governmental
and nongovernmental, created to administer economic development, to
monitor labor conditions, and to supervise political reform. Like Dimier,
Chafer highlights the signiﬁcance of the 1946 French colonial development program, the ﬁdes. Its implementation led to the emergence of a
whole new raft of colonial bureaucracy. So, too, did the establishment
of the colonial Labor Inspectorate (Inspection du travail), studied by
Frederick Cooper.71
These new bureaucracies remolded ofﬁcial attitudes toward long-term
structural change across French West Africa. For example, whereas before 1939 the African worker was typically depicted as a transient phenomenon to be tolerated but not encouraged, after 1945 state agencies
and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) presupposed that increasing
industrialization and proletarianization were inevitable. But if colonial
minds were changing, Chafer also argues that colonial policy became
less coherent as the proliferation of groups with a stake in governmental decisions, not to mention the emergence of stronger, more cohesive
nationalist groups, introduced greater complexity to the policymaking
process. There was, for instance, intense rivalry between the Inspection
du travail’s universalist ethos, which posited that French and African
workers should eventually be treated comparably, and the majority of
colonial government ofﬁcials who adhered to associationist thinking,
preferring traditional solutions to local problems. Implicit in this argument is that the new institutional mechanisms devised after 1945,
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which were meant to achieve policy coordination, were inadequate to
the task — that the ofﬁcial mind of French imperialism had broken down
into fragmentary elements.
Todd Shepard’s essay also connects past precedents to changing conceptualizations of empire. He does so by analyzing political debate in
Paris and Algiers over the scope and purpose of “integrationism” in
postwar Algeria.72 As Shepard notes, although formal French adoption
of the term “integration” is usually traced back to Interior Minister
François Mitterrand’s January 1955 announcement of French policy in
North Africa, both the idea and the terminology had longer antecedents.
In a fascinating discussion, he links integrationist thinking, most famously and most doggedly espoused by anthropologist-turned-Algerian
governor Jacques Soustelle, to earlier variants of the policy in mainland
France, in the United States, and, most notably in Soustelle’s case, in
Latin America. Central to the integrationists’ argument was the contention that France did not possess an empire. Rather, it was an empire:
hence their preference for the term France mondiale, “global France.”
Shepard’s forensic exploration of the intellectual roots of integrationism,
and the increasingly tortuous thinking of its proponents as the Algerian
revolution proceeded, reveals how certain of the brightest colonial minds
within France’s governing elite struggled to devise viable institutional
practices and citizenship reforms, the avowed, if unfulﬁlled, purpose of
which was a “deracialized imperialism.”
Alexander Keese’s contribution, the ﬁnal essay of volume 1, moves
us south of the Sahara once more. He investigates the French colonial
mind through the prism of elections and electoral procedures in the postwar years preceding decolonization’s perhaps artiﬁcial 1960 endpoint
in French West Africa. Elections took place with remarkable regularity
in the ﬁnal years of colonial rule throughout this vast region, widening
the circle of African populations able to participate in differing levels of
territorial representation. The process culminated in 1956–58 as votes
took place, ﬁrst over the French enabling law (Loi Cadre), and then
in referenda on membership of the French “Community” of Francophone African states.73 Superﬁcially at least, this might be construed
as a triumph of gradualism and democratic inclusion — a vindication
of reformist colonial minds. Not so. Keese makes plain that the reality
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of electoral practice was altogether different. As fears of organized nationalist opposition intensiﬁed, so the rigging of elections assumed new
forms. Keese reﬂects upon what this indicates, taking issue with British
imperial historian Kenneth Robinson’s identiﬁcation of a “French style”
of dealing with “natives” wishing to vote. In analyzing the methods by
which colonial authorities sought to control the outcome of elections,
Keese’s judgment is subtler. While he highlights the prevalence of state
coercion, ﬁnancial corruption, and manipulation of opinion, he also
concedes that in certain instances ofﬁcials were prepared to countenance
a free vote. His essay demonstrates that detailed study of these colonial
elections is an excellent vehicle for analysis of the gradual alteration
of ofﬁcial minds as resistance to decolonization diminished over time.
With the curtain fast descending on France’s empire in Africa, it is also
a ﬁtting point to close this ﬁrst volume of essays on facets of French
colonial minds at work.
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